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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)G) as this case
was transferred to this Court from the Supreme Court.
ISSUE

The District Court acted within its discretion when it enforced its
permanent injunction by ordering Cardon not to interfere with PacifiCorp' s
previously established right to cross Cardon' s property.
The District Court's decision to enforce its judgment is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93, 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);

Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945). Legal issues underlying that
decision are reviewed for correctness, and an error of law would constitute an
_abuse of discretion. Miller v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2012 UT 54, ,r 13 n.1, 285 P.3d
1208. The District Court's factual findings are reviewed under a deferential
clearly erroneous standard. Uhrhahn Const. & Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT
App 41,

,r 7, 179 P.3d 808.

The issue was preserved below. (R. 1, 10,240,309,312,339,390, 422.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the inherent authority of a district court to enforce its
own permanent injunction in the face of ongoing defiance by the enjoined party
and a request by the County Sheriff for a furthe! court order to be able to enforce
the court's judgment effective!y.
1

PacifiCorp filed its Complaint on February 18, 2009, and its Amended
@

Complaint on May 9, 2009. (R. 1, 10.) On March 29, 2011, the District Court
entered default judgment and granted the permanent injunction prayed for in
the Amended Complaint as a sanction after Cardon filed a fraudulent document

@

with a forged signature and engaged in other litigation abuses. (R. 240.)
PacifiCorp filed its Motion to Enforce Judgment on August 4, 2014. (R. 309.) The
@

District Court granted PacifiCorp's motion on November 3, 2014. (R. 422.)
Cardon appeals. (R. 427.)
Paul F. Cardon and PacifiCorp are neighboring property owners adjacent

(@

to Cutler Reservoir in Cache County, Utah. (R. 12.) PacifiCorp uses Cutler
Reservoir for its renewable energy Cutler hydroelectric project. (R. 339.) Pursuant
to a 1995 order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, PacifiCorp must
maintain a 200-foot buffer strip, conduct erosion control, install and maintain
fences, and meet other environmental requirements, all designed to protect the
integrity of the reservoir banks and improve water quality. (R. 11, 340.)
PacifiCorp has installed miles of fencing and other property line posts to create
more than 1100 a~res of shoreline buffer. (R. 340.) PacifiCorp's efforts to comply
with its federal license and to protect and improve .the water quality in Cutler
Reservoir have, unfortunately, led to years of conflict with Cardon. (R. 11-20,
341-44.)

2

Due to this conflict, PacifiCorp filed an action in First District Court. (R.
10.) The Amended Complaint alleged, inter alia, that Cardon installed an ·
irrigation pivot on PacifiCorp' s property and in doing so removed a fence. (R.
12.) As a result, cattle accessed and damaged the river and reservoir banks. (R.
12.) PacifiCorp repaired the fence but Cardon repeatedly cut the fence to make
room for his irrigation pivot and to allow his cattle on to PacifiCorp's riparian
property. (R. 12.)
The Amended Complaint also alleged that Cardon obstructed PacifiCorp' s
access rights to maintain and protect its federally mandated buffer area. (R. 1620.) As part of its pleadings, PacifiCorp alleged interference with its right to cross
Cardon' s property along a former county road and a lane, defined jointly as the
"Lane," which PacifiCorp had historically used to access its buffer area on the
other side of Cardon' s farm:
69. There exists a former county road or lane that connects to Sam
Fellow Road ("Lane"). For decades, PacifiCorp and its predecessors
in interest have used the Lane for access to Cutler Reservoir for
management and maintenance purposes.
70. Cardon has interfered with PacifiCorp' s maintenance and
management of Cutler Reservoir.
71. PacifiCorp is entitled to and requests a judgment enjoining
and prohibiting Cardon from further interfering with the
Cutler/Bear River water~ourse and PacifiCorp's access to Cutler
Reservoir over the Lane and otherwise ....

(R. 19-20.) The Amended Complaint asserted claims for nuisance and trespass
and sought a permanent injunction and statutory remedies. (R. 10-20.) Cardon
3

filed a Response to the Amended Complaint that was construed by the District
G;,

Court as including a Counterclaim. (R. 21,458 Tr. 8/18/10, p. 28.)
An illustrative schematic depicting Cutler Reservoir, Sam Fellow Road, the
Lane, and the PacifiCorp buffer is submitted on the next page for the Court's
convenience. The schematic is based on an aerial photo submitted in the record
at R. 346, with additional information provided here for illustrative purposes:
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Cardon represented himself in the case. (R. 21.) Although the District
Court gave Cardon "wide latitude," it also required Cardon to follow the Court's
rules. (R. 458, Tr. 8/18/10, p. 25.) The District Court found Cardon "willfully and
in bad faith" refused to respond to discovery requests. (R. 458, Tr. 8/18/10, pp.
25-26.) As a sanction, the District Court dismissed Cardon's Counterclaim. (R.
458, Tr. 8/18/10, p. 28.) The District Court also found Cardon in contempt for
@

failing to obey its discovery orders and imposed a sanction of $500, to be held in
abeyance. (R. 458, Tr. 8/18/10, p. 28.)
On February 15, 2011, the District Court scheduled a hearing "based on a

~

grave concern I have in the file." (R. 458, Tr. 2/15/11, p. 2.) Cardon had filed a
document titled "Plaintiff's Protective Order" that appeared to be filed by
@

PacifiCorp's attorney, David C. Wright. (R. 205.) The document was on Wright's
pleading heading and purported to contain Wright's signature on the certificate
of service. (R. 205-07, 458, Tr. 2/15/11, p. 6.) In reality, Cardon used the pleading
heading of PacifiCorp' s counsel and placed a copy of Wright's signature on the
certificate of service. (R. 458, Tr. 2/15/11, pp. 4-6.)
For these actions, the District Court found Cardon "perpetuated a fraud on
the Court" and ordered the parties to chambers. (R. 458, Tr. 2/15/11, pp. 4, 5.)
Cardon admitted he.prepared and filed the document. (R. 458, Tr. 2/15/11, p. 4.)
As a sanction, the District Court struck Cardon' s Response to the Amended
Complaint and entered default judgment against him:
5

... What's happened is a judgment has been entered against
you, a default judgment has been entered against you. I strike your I have stricken your answer. It's as if you did not even answer this
lawsuit because you have not followed the rules, you have not
cooperated, you've perpetuated a fraud on the court, you've done
everything you can to circumvent this case, including filing false and
misleading pleadings with the Court. Because of all those things, I
am striking your answer.

(R. 458, Tr. 2/15/11, p. 18.) The District Court reserved the issue of contempt. (R.
458, Tr. 2/15/11, p. 20.)
The District Court entered its Final Default Judgment on March 29, 2011.

(R. 240.) Paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Judgment immediately and p~rmanently
enjoined Cardon from destroying PacifiCorp' s fences, trespassing on
PacifiCorp' s property, damaging PacifiCorp' s property, interfering with
PacifiCorp' s operations at Cutler Reservoir, and allowing his cattle to damage
the banks of the Bear River and Cutler Reservoir. (R. 240-41.) Paragraph 9, which
was later-construed by the enforcement order at issue in this appeal,
permanently enjoined Cardon from:
Obstructing or preventing PacifiCorp access to Cutler Reservoir,.
including access along the former county road or lane that connects
to Sam Fellow Road and that crosses through defendant's property.

(R. 241.) The District Court advised Cardon to consult a lawyer regarding his
rights to appeal. (R. 458, Tr. 2/15/11, pp. 20-21.) However, Cardqn did not
appeal the Final Default Judgment.

6

Despite entry of the Judgment, Cardon continued to act adversely to
PacifiCorp in violation of the Judgment, prompting PacifiCorp to file a Motion
for a Finding of Contempt and to Enforce Judgment. (R. 252, 254.) Following an
evidentiary hearing, the District Court found Cardon committed eight separate
instances of contempt, violating Paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Final Default
Judgment. (R. 240-41, 458, Tr. 3/26/12, pp. 3, 105.) The District Court also found
Cardon in contempt for his previous fraudulent pleading - the sanction for
II

which had been deferred - in which Cardon cut and paste the attorney for the
petitioner's heading and the attorney's signature onto a document, purporting it
~

to be from the petitioner's attorney, and filed it with the Court." (R. 458, Tr.
3/26/12, pp. 105-06.) The District Court imposed a fine of $1,000 and ordered

@

Cardon to serve five days in the Cache County Jail. (R. 458, Tr. 3/26/12, p. 106.)
The fine was rescinded with PacifiCorp' s agreement following the District
Court's receipt of a letter from Cardon's wife explaining the negative financial
impact on his family of the Court's sanctions. (R. 290,296, 302-03.) Cardon did
not appeal any of these rulings.
Cardon' s time in jail, however, did not have the intended effect of
convincing Cardon to abide by the Judgment and respect the judicial authority
the Judgment represents. Several months later, Cardon began again to violate the

@

Judgment repeatedly.

7

PacifiCorp annually inspects all buffer areas and fences surrounding
Cutler Reservoir in order to comply with its Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission license, and its Resource Management Plan. (R. 339-41.) Eve F.
Davies is PacifiCorp' s principal scientist for hydro resources, and is responsible
for conducting inspections of Cutler Reservoir, including property adjacent to
the Cardon property. (R. 339-41.)
On July 26, 2012, Davies, two contractors, and Cache County Deputy
Sheriff Casey Sutherland visited the Cardon property for an annual inspection.

(R. 341.) Davies asked for a law enforcement escort due to safety concerns
foIIowing an earlier confrontation with Cardon on June 6, 2012. (R. 341.) Davies
and the group drove down the Lane described in Paragraph 9 of the Judgment.

(R. 341.) A farm truck was parked at a narrow point, blocking the Lane, so
Deputy Sutherland obtained permission from Cardon' s wife to use another
route. (R. 341, 347.) Accordingly, the group took a detour on the alternate route,_
then reconnected to the Lane that PacifiCorp had historically used. (R. 341.) After
the inspection, which took approximately 10 minutes, Davies returned to her
vehicle and began driving back. (R. 341-42.) Upon her return to the Lane, she
encountered irrigation water in the road from a pipe that had been turned on in
the 20 or so minutes since her group had passed that way. (R. 342.) The water
created muddy conditions that threatened to make the route impassable in a
short amount of time. (R. 342.) As a result of the flooding, Davies observed
8

Deputy Sutherland's patrol car "fish tail" in the mud. (R. 342.) Then, on their
@

return to the alternate path taken approximately 20-30 minutes earlier, the group
encountered a front-end loader now blocking their path, requiring them to exit
through a different route. (R. 342, 348.) Although Davies did not see Cardon, it
was apparent he was present because of the activities that took place during the
group's visit. (R. 342.)

(i)

Davies conducted the next annual inspection on July 17, 2013. She was
accompanied by two contractors and two Cache County Deputy Sheriffs. (R.
342.) As the group approached the Cardon property, they saw a large piece of
farm equipment blocking the right side of the Lane. (R. 343.) Davies then
witnessed Cardon move a second large tractor into the ~ane, blocking the left
side access as well to prevent passage by PacifiCorp and the Sheriff escort. (R.
343, 349.) As Davies' vehicle approached, Cardon exited the tractor and
disappeared quickly into the surrounding outbuildings. (R. 343.) The Sheriff's
Deputies were subsequently unable to locate Cardon or anyone at his house, and
PacifiCorp was thus unable to complete its annual inspection for 2013. (R. 343.)
Davies returned to the property the next year on June 4, 2014, with a
technician and Cache County Deputy Sheriff Shane Zilles after alerting Cardon' s
father of the impending inspection. (R. 343.) Cardon's father approached Davies

'i>

while she was opening a gate and said there was "going to be trouble." (R. 344.)
Davies asked what he meant, to which Cardon' s father responded she would
9

"find out" and should just go do whatever she felt she had to do. (R. 344.)
Cardon's father then advised Deputy Zilles that the Cardons did not believe the
Judgment gave PacifiCorp the right to cross through Cardon' s property past the
point where the old county road ended, an assertion Cardon himself had made
previously to Davies. (R. 344.) Davies showed Deputy Zilles the Judgment, but
the Sheriff's Deputy "stated that without a further Court order, he cannot
definitively instruct Cardon as to the meaning of the Judgment, because Cardon
believes the Judgment states something different." (R. 344.)
PacifiCorp consequently filed its Motion to Enforce Judgment on August 4,
2014. (R. 309.) The motion asked for an order: (1) requiring Cardon "to allow
access as required by Paragraph 9 of the Judgment," and (2) "directing the Cache
County Sheriff's Office to enforce the Judgment." (R. 309.) This motion was
necessary to protect the safety of Davies and other PacifiCorp employees in light
of Cardon' s behavior and to allow the Cache County Sheriff's Office to enforce
the Judgment given Cardon's newly asserted position as to a different meaning
of the Court's prior orders. (R. 317-18.)

In a Memorandum Decision entered November 3, 2014, the District Court
granted the motion. (R. 422.) In a succinct and straightforward substantive
ruling, the District Court concluded the relief was necessary and proper:
"A judgment must be enforced as written if the language is clear and
unambiguous." Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). Cardon attempts to create an ambiguity where none exists. He
10

contends PacifiCorp has ample access to Cutler Reservoir long before
reaching the Cardon farmyard. Simple access to Cutler Reservoir is not
what PacifiCorp requested. The underlying purpose of the lawsuit was to
prevent Cardon from interfering with PacifiCorp' s legal obligation to
maintain the buffer strip on its property. PacifiCorp cannot perform that
obligation if it cannot access the property. Naturally, the Judgment does
not give PacifiCorp unfettered access to go wherever it wants on Cardon' s
property. It does, however, provide limited access to the buffer strip
11
along the former country [sic] road or lane that connects to Sam Fellow
Road and that crosses through Defendant's property." This includes the
lane that passes through Cardon' s farm yard and connects with the
pathway leading to PacifiCorp's property.

(R. 424.) The District Court entered an Order on its ruling on December 4, 2014,
memorializing the same conclusions. (R. 441.) The District Court's decision to
~

grant PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce Judgment is before this Court following
Cardon's appeal of that ruling. (R. ~27.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The District Court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing its own prior
Judgment. The language of the Judgment was not ambiguous, and the purpose
and intent of the proceedings to secure PacifiCorp' s access free from Cardon' s
interference were clear from the outset. Cardon was in constant violation and
contempt of Court orders and rules and did not present a reasonable basis for
@

disputing the requirements of the Judgment. The District Court's enforcement
order was necessary for the Sheriff's Office to have a comfort level when
enforcing the Judgment that was jeopardized by Cardon' s proffered contrary
interpretation. The District Court acted well within its sound discretion in

11

ordering the Judgment enforced as it did: the order is consistent with the original
intent and language of the Judgment allowing PacifiCorp access to its buffer area
across Cardon' s land to comply with its federal maintenance requirements on
Cutler Reservoir. Given the nature of Cardon' s conduct and the evidence
presented to the District Court by PacifiCorp, the findings underlying the
enforcement order were not clearly erroneous and the order was fully compliant
with the law.
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by declining to hold an
evidentiary hearing before making its decision. The District Court considered the
evidence presented by Cardon and found no need for a hearing given the state of
the record and the prior extensive proceedings. Cardon has demonstrated no
good reason to disturb this decision, let alone made a showing of reversible
error.
For these reasons, the order granting PacifiCorp' s Motion to Enforce
Judgment should be affirmed in all respects.
ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court's Order Enforcing the Judgment Is Not an Abuse of
Discretion.

A district court has inherent power to enforce its own judgment. "It is a
mockery of justice to give on~ a judgment and then deny him the means of its
enforcement. Every court has the inherent authority, and upon it rests the duty of

12

enforcing its own judgments and decrees by proper orders and directions ...."

Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 159 P. 541,544 (Utah 1916) (citation and
quotations omitted).
The District Court's enforcement of its own Judgni.ent is reviewed under
@

an abuse of discretion standard. This Court has recognized that "[t]he inherent
power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to enforce its decree .. .is
@

generally recognized .... We will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings
that rest within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an abuse of
discretion clearly appears from the record." Ward v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93, 96

Q)

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation and quotations omitted). The United States
Supreme Court, among many other courts, has likewise recognized that
®

construction of an injunction lies within the "sound discretion" of the District
Court. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 15 (1945).
The District Court's discretion is based in "the fact that an injunction often
requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continued
willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf of the party who
obtained that equitable relief." System Fed. No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647
(1961). In this connection, a district court also has broad discretion to clarify its
own injunctive orders to the extent that becomes necessary. See, e.g., Flavor Corp.

@

v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[W]e hold that the District
Court which issues an injunction has ... 'wide discretion' to clarify or define the
13

original injunction .... ") (citation omitted); N.A. Sales Co. v. Chapman Indus. Corp.,
736 F.2d 854,858 (2nd Cir. 1984) ("Clarifications of orders previously issued" are
within trial court's discretion); CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. Echostar Comm'n, 532 F.3d
1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2008) (district's court's decision to "clarify or modify an
injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion").
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it enforced and
further elucidated Paragraph 9 of the Judgment, ordering Cardon to cease from
interfering with PacifiCorp's right to cross Cardon's property. Paragraph 9 of the
original Judgment had permanently enjoined Cardon from:
Obstructing or preventing access to Cutler Reservoir, including access
along the former county road or lane that connects to Sam Fellow Road
and that crosses through defendant's property.

(R. 241.) The overarching directive of Paragraph 9 was simple: Cardon was not to
obstruct or prevent PacifiCorp from accessing Cutler Reservoir, which included
that part of Cutler Reservoir adjacent to PacifiCorp's property, and which at
times required crossing through Cardon's property to access. The undisputed
evidence proved Cardon nevertheless subsequently obstructed and prevented
PacifiCorp's access on multiple occasions over several years after entry of the
Judgment.
In 2012, Cardon turned on water to make the Lane impassable and used
farm equipment to obstruct PacifiCorp and its law enforcement escort. (R. 341-42,
347-48.) In 2013, Cardon again blocked PacifiCorp and law enforcement with
14

farm equipment, then disappeared so he could not be contacted and prevented
PacifiCorp's annual inspection altogether. (R. 342-43, 349.) In 2014, Cardon and
his family asserted PacifiCorp was not allowed to pass over historic access on the
Lane beyond his barnyard despite the language of the Judgment. (R. 343-44.)
Cardon did not dispute these facts below. In enforcing the Judgment, the District
Court observed: "Simple access to Cutler Reservoir is not what PacifiCorp
®

requested. The underlying purpose of the lawsuit was to prevent Cardon from
interfering with PacifiCorp's legal obligation to maintain the buffer strip on its
property." (R. 424.) This finding is not clearly erroneous. Uhrhahn Const. &

~

Design, Inc. v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41, ,r 7, 179 P.3d 808 (factual findings are
reviewed under a "deferential clearly erroneous standard"). In fact, it is exactly

®

right.
There is likewise no legal error, as Cardon asserts. The original Judgment
specifically directed that PacifiCorp had the right to cross through Cardon' s
property. (R. 241.) Cardon's new assertion in 2014 that PacifiCorp's access rights
ended before they reached his property therefore did not raise a reasonable or
even colorable argument of ambiguity in the Judgment. See, e.g., Saleh v. Farmers

Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ,I 17, 133 P.3d 428 (setting forth requirement of reasonable
alternate constructio•n in light of language used and observing further that
@

"words and phrases do not qualify as ambiguous simply because one party seeks

15

to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her own
interests").
The District Court was well within its discretion when it held Cardon to
what had already been decided in Paragraph 9 of the Judgment. The District
Court was careful to note that its injunction did not grant PacifiCorp carte
blanche to drive anywhere on the Cardon property, but was limited to the right
that had been identified in Paragraph 9 and was established by the.evidence:
... Naturally, the Judgment does not give PacifiCorp unfettered
access to go wherever it wants on Cardon' s property. It does, however,
provide limited access to the buffer strip 'along the former country [sic]
road or lane that connects to Sam Fellow Road and that crosses through
Defendant's property ....

(R. 424; see also R. 241.)
The District Court also acted within its discretion based on established
record facts when it ruled the Lane described in its Judgment does not, in fact,
terminate at the Cardon barnyard, but continues u through Cardon' s farm yard
and connects with the pathway leading to PacifiCorp's property." (R. 424.) This
ruling should be affirmed as an exercise of the District Court's inherent
discretion to enforce its Judgment. Ward, 776 P.2d at 96.
Cardon' s claims with respect to his new interpretation of Paragraph 9 in
the Judgment are untenable. According to Cardon, because access to the water's
edge on one part of the Reservoir is available before his barnyard, PacifiCorp
may not cross the barnyard. Cardon' s argument disregards both the plain

16

language and the intent of the Judgment. The very purpose of Paragraph 9 was
to allow PacifiCorp to cross Cardon' s property by vehicle on ~he route it had
used "for decades." (R. 19.) There is no textual support for the severe limitation
Cardon seeks to impose. There is nothing about the term "'Cutler Reservoir" that
(i)

is limited to only that portion of the Reservoir that is accessible before the
Cardon barnyard. Access through Cardon' s property is necessary for PacifiCorp
ii>

to reach its buffer area on the far side of Cardon' s farm from Sam Fellow Road.

(R. 346; see Schematic, supra, following page 4 of this brief.) Paragraph 9 is broad
enough to include the lane on either side of the Cardon barnyard. Paragraph 9
does not envision or state that PacifiCorp must stop before the barnyard and
launch a boat in order to access its property on the far side. PacifiCorp's.
Amended Complaint alleged an established right to drive over Cardon' s
property on a route PacifiCorp had used "for decades" to monitor conditions in
and near Cutler Reservoir, and the Judgment established that right. The District
Court properly emphasized that fact in enforcing its Judgment, and it acted well
within its discretion in doing so on this record.
The District Court construed Paragraph 9 of the Judgment in relation to
the overall purpose of the Judgment and in harmony with Paragraphs 1-8. (R.
424.) Paragraphs 1-8 each relate to PacifiCorp' s property and enjoin Cardon from
trespassing upon or harming PacifiCorp's property. (R. 240-41.) Paragraph 6
enjoins Cardon from "[i]nterfering with PacifiCorp operations at Cutler
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Reservoir" and Paragraph 8 enjoins Cardon from damaging "the vegetation
along the banks of the Bear River and/ or Cutler Reservoir." (R. 241.) Paragraph 9
ensures PacifiCorp is able to access its property so it can protect its property and
perform its management and maintenance obligations. (R. 241.)
The District Court was familiar with the facts and circumstances of
Cardon's activities on PacifiCorp's property and the purpose of Paragraph 9.
Following an earlier evidentiary hearing, the District Court had found Cardon
violated faragraphs 1-8 of the Judgment when he continued to damage
PacifiCorp's fences and allow his cattle to damage the riparian areas after entry
of the Judgment prohibiting just this conduct. (R. 458, Tr. 3/26/12, p. 105.) The
District Court rejected Cardon' s suggestion that he was not violating the terms of
the Judgment by preventing PacifiCorp's access across his property. (R. 424.) The
District Court emphasized the language from the Judgment that PacifiCorp may
use the Lane that "crosses through Defendant's property." (R. 424, 241.) This
ruling was well-reasoned, supported by the evidence, and squarely within the
District Court's inherent discretion to enforce its permanent injunction.
PacifiCorp' s evidence established the historically used Lane described in
the Judgment passed through what is now the Cardon barnyard, allowing
PacifiCorp to drive over the Lane to access its property. (R. 11,241,341, 346.)
PacifiCorp established, through the D_avies Declaration, that the road mentioned
in Paragraph 9 actually passes through and beyond the Cardon barnyard: "An
18

aerial photograph depicting the lane mentioned in Paragraph 9 of the Final
Default Judgment is attached as Exhibit A." (R. 341.) Exhibit A reveals an
established route up to, through, and beyond the Cardon barnyard. (R. 346; see

also Schematic,· supra, following page 4 of this brief.) Given this evidence, the
District Court's findings cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. See Doelle v.

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989) ("Atrial court's factual finding is
®

deemed 'clearly erroneous' only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence.").
Although Cardon now claims on appeal the Order improperly expanded
PacifiCorp' s access rights into his "curtilage," the curtilage argument was not

t
preserved. "Preservation requires affording the district court a meaningful
opportunity· to rule on the ground that is advanced on appeal, and that implies,
~

at a minimum, not just the invocation of a legal principle but also its application
to the facts of the case." Hill v. Superior Property Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60,
146,321 P.3d 1054. Cardon failed even to mention the word "curtilage" below,
claiming instead merely that the Judgment did not allow access through the
"barn yard" and "farmyard." (R. 387, 379.) Cardon now cites a U.S. Supreme
Court Fourth Amendment case, but the Fourth Am~ndment does not apply to
PacifiCorp's private access rights under the Judgment. See State v. Ellingsworth,
966 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Fourth Amendment strictures apply

@

only to searches or seizures of an individual constituting state action). In any
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event, whatever legal theory Cardon hopes to advance through his reference to
the doctrine of curtilage, it was not preserved.
Cardon also failed to present any evidence the District Court allowed
PacifiCorp access into any area associated with Cardon's home. "At common
law, the curtilage is'the area to which extends the intimate activity associated
with the fsanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' and therefore has
been considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver v.

United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citation omitted). Cardon did not argue or
present any evidence to the District Court that the Lane described in the
Judgment interfered with any area that could be considered "curtilage" under
the common law. Instead, Cardon failed to persuasively oppose PacifiCorp' s
evidence that the Lane described in the Judgment passed directly through the
barnyard and so should be enforced that way. (R. 341, 346.)
Cardon's argument that the enforcement order grants rights beyond what
was alleged in the Amended Complaint is also not well taken. Cardon provides
only conclusory statements to support his claim, and he does not provide any
serious analysis of the allegations or explain why the allegations would restrict
access in a manner he now urges. The Amended Complaint expressly describes
an established right to the Reservoir via the described Lane with which Cardon
was interfering:
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69.
There exists a former county road or lane that connects to Sam
Fellow Road ('Lane'). For decades, PacifiCorp and its predecessors
in interest have used the Lane for access to Cutler Reservoir for
management and maintenance purposes."
70.
Cardon has interfered with PacifiCorp' s maintenance and
management of Cutler Reservoir.
71.
PacifiCorp is entitled to and requests a judgment enjoining
and prohibiting Cardon from further interfering with the
Cutler/Bear River watercourse and PacifiCorp's access to Cutler
Reservoir over the Lane and otherwise ....

(R. 19-20) (emphasis added).
The Amended Complaint alleged PacifiCorp has the right to travel across
the Lane to reach its property based on historic use of the Lane. The effect of the
Default Judgment was to establish PacifiCorp's right to travel on the Lane over
the subject property as requested in the Amended Complaint. See Sewell v. Xpress

Lube, 2013 UT 61, ,r 36, 321 P.3d 1080 (" As a general rule, a default judgment
establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiffs as to each
cause of action alleged in the complaint.") (citation and quotations omitted); see
@

also Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1983) (default decree "did not exceed the
fair scope of the allegations and demand for relief of the complaint"); cf Fu v.

Rhodes, 2013 UT App 120, ,r 29, 304 P.3d 80 (McHugh, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("'One effect of a default.is that the factual allegations of the
claim ... are deemed to be admitted by the defaulting party. Therefore, on appeal
from a default judgment, the defaulting party may not contest those facts."')
(quoting 10 James Wm. Moore, et aL, Moore's Federal Practice§ 55.60[1] (3d ed.
21

2013), and collecting other citations), cert. granted, 317 P.3d 432, main op. overruled

by Wisan v. City of Hildale, 2014 UT 20, 330 P.3d 76.

The District Court's Order that PacifiCorp has the right to travel over the
Lane identified in the Judgment is squarely within Paragraphs 69-71 of the
Amended Complaint. The Cardon property is adjacent to PacifiCorp' s property,
as shown by Exhibit A to the Davies Declaration filed below. (R. 346; see also
Schematic, supra, following page 4 of this brief.) The Amended Complaint
alleged a right to use historic access to reach PacifiCorp' s property for
management and maintenance purposes. (R. 19-20.) The District Court
recognized this fact when it correctly reasoned: "The underlying purpose of the
lawsuit was to prevent Cardon from interfering with PacifiCorp' s legal
obligation to maintain the buffer strip on its property. PacifiCorp cannot perform
that obligation if it cannot access the property." (R. 424.)
Cardon argues the District Court lacked a sufficient factual basis to
recognize any access right because the right sought to be established by the
Amended Complaint was a prescriptive easement. This argument is not properly
before the Court, as Cardon did not appeal the Final Default Judgment in 2011.
The legal effect of the Default Judgment was to grant the relief requested by
PacifiCorp, including a declaration of an established access right across the
Cardon property and an order prohibiting Cardon from inter£ering with such
right. See Sewell, 2013 UT 61, ,r 36. The Court should therefore reject Cardon's
22

claim that the Order expanded in any way the broad relief requested in the
Amended Complaint and granted by the Default Judgment.
To the extent it is reviewable at all, the Amended Complaint sufficiently
alleges a prescriptive easement. Paragraph 69 alleges open and continuous use
"for decades." (R. 19.) "[O]nce a claimant has shown an open and continuous use
of the land under claim of right for the twenty-year prescriptive period, the use
@

will be presumed to have been adverse." Van Denburgh v. Sweeney Land Co., 2013
UT App 265, ,r 3,315 P.3d 1058 (citation and quotations omitted). The Default
Judgment therefore established the existence of a prescriptive easement as a

@

matter of law. Sewell, 2013 UT 61, ,r 36. In fact, Cardon's prescriptive easement
argument is an admission thatthe Amended Complaint actually does allege a
right to cross Cardon's property. It thus undermines his own principal argument
that the Amended Complaint contains no such allegation.
Cardon also argues PacifiCorp moved to enforce the Judgment in order to
obtain a covert extension of its Judgment rights. He suggests the proper
enforcement procedure would have been to seek a finding of contempt.
PacifiCorp' s argument below recognized that Cardon was in contempt, but it
sought an approach to Cardon' s actions that would place less of a burden on him
and his family: "Cardon's actions are in plain violation and are contemptuous.
~

Rather than seeking to have Cardon held in contempt at this time, however,
PacifiCorp seeks only to ensure peaceable access to its property by obtaining an
23

order to enforce the Judgment." (R. 313.) Cardon had previously been held in
contempt and served a brief jail sentence, but his wife had expressed a concern to
the District Court that its orders were negatively impacting the finances of his
family, a fact the District Judge had taken into consideration when acting
leniently with respect to prior contempt decisions. (R. 290,296, 302-03, 458, Tr.
3/26/12, p. 106.) PacifiCorp acted reasonably and responsibly in seek~g a
simple judicial declaration with respect to the scope of the access rights rather
than escalating the situation by seeking to have Cardon incarcerated for a second
time or fined additional sums, particularly in light of Cardon' s farming
obligations in late summer with harvest approaching.
PacifiCorp also acted prudently to protect the safety of its employees in
light of Cardon' s mischief, bizarre behavior, and utter disregard for the office
and authority of the County Sheriff and the District Judge, whose duties
included enforcing the Court's orders. See Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 159 P.
541,544 (Utah 1916) (trial court has "duty of enforcing its own judgments and
decrees by proper orders and directions to ministerial officers to that end")
(citation and quotations omitted); cf State v. Graham, 2011 UT App 332, ,r 27,263
P.3d 569 (government's fundamental responsibilities include enforcing the law).
Seeking enforcement of the Judgment to resolve any good-faith objection by
Cardon, rather than seeking a finding of contempt and additional jail time or
monetary sanctions, supported this objective. Cardon should not be heard to
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complain about PacifiCorp' s taking a middle course that was lawfully available
to it rather than seeking harsher sanctions with a greater negative impact on
Cardon and his family.
Lastly on this point, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60 did not
prohibit the District Court from enforcing its Judgment. To the extent they apply
at all, Rules 59 and 60 provide further confirmation that Cardon may not now
@

attempt, four years after the entry of Default Judgment, to obtain relief from
Paragraph 9 by making arguments that should have been made before or at the
time of entry of the original Judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59, 60 (establishing
time limits for filing motions under these rules).
In sum, the District Court acted properly within its broad discretion to

@

enforce its Judgment. That ruling should be affirmed by this Court.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When It Enforced Its
Judgment Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing.

Cardon also argues the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary
hearing before granting an injunction. This argument fails for at least three
reasons.
First, Cardon did not appeal the Judgment that was entered against him in
2011. (R. 240.) Cardon's citation to a 2000 letter (R. 383) in hopes of identifying a
factual dispute related to PacifiCorp's historic access rights and activities is no
longer material given the Default Judgment, in which PacifiCorp established its
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right to cross the Cardon property as a matter of law. See Sewell, 2013 UT 61,

CU

36.

Cardon may not relitigate this issue now.
Second, the Motion to Enforce sought to enforce an existing permanent
injunction. (R. 309.) The District Court's inherent authority to enforce its own
judgments did not require an evidentiary hearing because the existing Judgment
already enjoined Cardon from interfering with PacifiCorp' s right of access across
Cardon's property. The enforcement order simply rejected Cardon's legal
interpretation based on the plain language of the Judgment. (R. 422.) The District
Court cited this Court's decision in Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389,391 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990), for the proposition that "[a] judgment must be enforced as
written if the language is clear and unambiguous." (R. 422.) There was no
ambiguity to speak of. See supra Part I.
Third, a hearing under the governing Rules of Civil Procedure is
_discretionary. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e) ("The Court may hold a hearing on any
motion.") (emphasis added). The District Court exercised its discretion not to
hold a hearing, citing to Rule 7(e) and concluding that the issue raised by the
enforcement motion had already been authoritatively decided by the Court's
own prior decisions. (R. 424; cf Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e), allowing decisions even on
dispositive motions and even if a party has requested a hearing if "the issue has
been authoritatively decided"). The District Court had already presided over the
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case for more than five years, holding multiple hearings; had entered the very
Ci)

Judgment in question; and had held previous post-Judgment proceedings to
interpret and enforce the terms of the Judgment and hold Cardon in contempt.

(R. 458, passim.) An evidentiary hearing would only have cost the litigants and
the Court additional resources on an issue that had already been considered.
And, notably, the District Court had before it the evidence that was proffered by
@

both sides in relation to PacifiCorp's motion. (R. 339, 386.)
On this record, the District Court acted well within its discretion to rule
without another hearing. Cardon fails to show· any error in that decision, let
alone reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 900 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (no reversal without showing of prejudicial error).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court's
Order in all respects. Because this result clearly appears from the record, and
because Cardon has not requested oral argument, a hearing is unnecessary
unless the Court has questions it wishes counsel to answer.
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STATE OF UTAH
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY

PACIFICORP,

:

AMENDEDCOMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 090100469

PAUL F. CARDON,
Defendant.

Judge Thomas L. Willmore

Plaintiff complains as follows:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

Plaintiff is an Oregon corporation doing business in Utah as Rocky Mountain

Power and is engaged in among other things the business of electric power generation and

transmission.
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. PacifiCorp v. Cardon
Case No. 090100469
Amended Complaint

2.

Defendant, Paul Cardon, is an individual who on information and belief resides in

Cache County, Utah.
3.

Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78A-5-

4.

Venue in Weber County is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-

102(1).

301(1)(c).
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

5.

Pursuant to an Order Issuing New License, Project No. 2420-001, issued April 29,

1994 by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in connection with Pacifi.Corp's
Cutler Project, PacifiCorp is obligated to maintain a buffer strip, up to 200 feet wide, install and
maintain fences, among other things, all designed to protect its property and the integrity of the
Cutler Project.
6.

PacifiCorp was further required to prepare and implement a Resource

Management Plan, which it did in July, 1995.
7.

An Order approving that plan was issued by FERC in November, 1995.

8.

That Plan and Order require a permanent vegetative buffer around the reservoir on

lands owned by PacifiCorp, erosion control and other features, most of which are designed to
prevent farming and agricultural encroachment to protect the integrity of the reservoir banks and
improve water quality.
9.

By 2002, PacifiCorp installed fencing and other property line posts at Cutler

Reservoir, totaling more than 40 miles and 1100 acres of shoreline buffer.
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10.

On information and belief, defendant owns certain real property located at 4409

West 4700 North, Smithfield, Utah 84335-9770 (the "Cardon Property'').

11.

The Cardon Property is adjacent to Cutler Reservoir and the Cutler Project.

12.

The Cardon Property is also adjacent to a flooding easement owned by PacifiCorp

that runs along the edge of Cutler Reservoir, between the reservoir and the Cardon Property.
PacifiCorp is required to maintain and monitor the flooding easement as part of its FERC license
and Cutler Reservoir obligations.

13.

PacifiCorp is further required under its FERC licensing obligations to control the

property adjacent to the Cutler Project, including areas along Cutler Reservoir and the Bear
River and the slough area adjacent to the Cardon Property.

14.

Defendant has installed an irrigation_pivot, and in doing so removed or cut a

portion of Pacifi.Corp's fence along the bank of Cutler Reservoir.

15.

Defendant has installed the irrigation pivot across PacifiCorp's property.

16.

As a result of defendant's actions, livestock now access the river/reservoir banks,

degrading the banks
17.

PacifiCorp bas tried to repair the fence and control the gate, but the fence has

been cut repeatedly to allow the pivot and Cardon' s cattle onto PacifiCorp lands.
18.

PacifiCorp has had previous pi;operty and boundary issues with Cardon. In 2001,

PacifiCorp brought an action against Cardon in the Second District Court, styled PacifiCorp v.

Cardon, Civil No. 010101240 (the "Action").
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19.

The purpose of the Action was to quiet title to certain property in which defendant

claimed or may have claimed

an

interest.

The Action also sought an injunction aimed at

preventing defendant from interfering with PacifiCorp's efforts to install posts to identify its
respective property boundaries.
20.

On March 11, 2003, the court entered an interim order permitting PacifiCorp to

install posts and fences in accordance with its survey. Defendant was restrained from interfering

with PacifiCorp' s installation.
21.

On March 3, 2006, the court entered partial summary judgment in PacifiCorp's

favor, quieting title to certain surveyed property. The Action was dismissed without prejudice on
June 19, 2006.
22.

On its property adjacent to defendant's property, PacifiCorp has removed a gate

installed at the request of defendant and repaired its fence.
23.

Since at least June, 2008, Paci:fiCorp's fence has been twice damaged/cut at the

location of defendant's irrigation pivot.
24.

Defendant has further permitted his· livestock to trespass on to Pacifi.Corp's

property.
25.

Defendant does not own stockwater rights at the Cardon property.
FIRsTCLAJM

(Public Nuisance and Nuisance per se)
26.

458051vl
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27.

Cardon's (1) destruction or removal of Pacifi.Corp's fence, (2) unauthorized use of.

PacifiCorp's property, (3) damage to Pacifi.Corp's property, (4) interference with Pacifi.Corp's
above-described FERC obligations, (5) grazing/stockwatering on PacifiCorp property, (6)
destroying or permitting the destruction of the vegetation within the FERC-required buffer zone,
together or separately constitute a public nuisance inasmuch as this conduct is an unlawful
interference with or obstruction of PacifiCorp's property rights and federal statutory and
regulatory obligations.
28.

Cardon is strictly liable for this public nuisance.

29.

PacifiCorp has been injured by reason of this nuisance in a manner distinct from

any general public injury.
30.

PacifiCorp has sustained consequential damages by reason of Cardon's creation

of this nuisance and requests a judgment in an amount to be determined at trial; plus available
consequential damages.
SECOND CLAIM

(Private Nuisance)
31.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding allegations.

32.

Cardon's (1) destruction or removal of PacifiCorp's fence, (2) unauthorized use of

PacifiCorp's property, (3) damage to Pacifi.Corp's property, (4) interference with PacifiCorp's
above-described FERC obligations, (5) grazing/stockwatering on PacifiCorp property, (6)
destroying or permitting the destruction of the vegetation within the FERC-required buffer zone,
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()

together or separately constitutes a substantial, significant and unreasonable interference with the
use and enjoyment of Pacifi.Corp's Cutler Project property.

33.

Cardon's destruction of and encroachment and trespass on Paci:fi.Corp's property

has further interfered with and jeopardized PacifiCorp's FERC license obligations and approval.
34.

PacifiCorp has been damaged by reason of this private nuisance in an amount to

be established at trial.

35.

Cardon's conduct is and has been willful and malicious, or manifests a knowing

and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the property rights of PacifiCorp within the
meaning ofUtah Code Ann.§ 78-18-l(l)(a).

36.

PacifiCorp is entitled to and requests a judgment against Cardon for private

nuisance, including punitive damages and available consequential damages.
THIRD CLAIM

(Trespass)
37.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the preceding allegations.

38.

PacifiCorp installed a fence on its property adjacent Cardon's property.

39.

To secure the Cutler Project and Reservoir against trespass, disturbance and

damage, PacifiCorp installed a fence along the reservoir as part of Pacifi.Corp's FERC license
compliance obligations.
40.

Since that time, Cardon installed an irrigation pivot, which included removing or

cutting a portion of PacifiCorp's fence, and allowing that pivot to cross PacifiCorp's property.
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As a result, livestock now access the river/reservoir banks, degrading the banks

41.

and impacting water quality. No stockwatering right exists for this use.
PacifiCorp has tried to repair the fence and control the gate, but it was repeatedly

42.

left open, contrary to agreement by defendant.
43.

PacifiCorp has since removed the gate and repaired its fence.

44.

Since at least June, 2008, Pacifi.Corp's fence near Cardon's irrigation pivot has

been twice damaged again.
45.

Cardon continues to allow his cattle to graze or otherwise C(?me on to PacifiCorp

property.
46.

Cardon's conduct as described above constitutes unlawful trespass.

47.

PacifiCorp has been damaged by reason of this trespass in an amount to be

established at trial.
Cardon' s conduct is and has been willful and malicious, or manifests a knowing

48.

and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the ·property rights of PacifiCorp within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(l){a).
PacifiCorp is entitled to and requests a judgment against Cardon for trespass,

49.

including punitive damages and available consequential damages.
FOURTH CLAIM

(Permanent Injunction)
50.

Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations.
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51.

\,;~)

Cardon's (1) destruction or removal of PacifiCorp's fence, (2) unauthorized use of

PacifiCorp's property, (3) damage to PacifiCorp's property, (4) interference with PacifiCorp's
above-described FERC obligations, (5) grazing/stockwatering on PacifiCorp property, (6)
destroying

or permitting the destruction of the vegetation within the FERC-required buffer zone,

together or separately constitutes a substantial, significant and unreasonable interference with the
use and enjoyment of PacifiCorp' s Cutler Project property and threatens irreparable injury due to
its impact on PacifiCorp's FERC license for the Cutler Project.

52.

The threatened injury to PacifiCorp outweighs whatever damage an order

enjoining Cardon would cause inasmuch as Cardon does not have any protected property interest
in the PacifiCorp property.

53.

An injunction against Cardon would not be adverse to the public interest and

would in fact further the public interest through the protection of the Cutler Project.
54.

Because PacifiCorp enjoys undisputed property rights, there is a substantial

likelihood that PacifiCorp will prevail on the merits of its claims.

55.

PacifiCorp js entitled to and requests a preliminary injunction and a judgment

permanently enjoining Cardon from further interference with and trespass and encroachment on
PacifiCorp's property, including
a.

a judgment ordering Cardon to remove all personal properfy stored on

PacifiCorp 's property;

b.

a judgment enjoining further use of and trespass and encroachmen~ including

farming and other agricultural operation and irrigation, on Paci:fiCorp's property;
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a judgment enjoining further interference with, damage to and trespass and

c.

encroachment o~ Pacifi.Corp's property.
FIFTH CLAIM

(Obstruction of Watercourse- UTAHCODEA.NN. § 73..J..JS andlnte,ference with
Maintenance Access).
56.

Plaintiff incorporates the preceding allegations.

57.

Whenever any person has a right-of-way of any established type or title for any

canal or other watercourse it shall be unlawful for any person to place or maintain in place any
obstruction along such canal or watercourse without first receiving written permission for the
~hange and providing gates sufficient for the passage of the owner or owners of such canal or
watercourse.
58.

The vested rights in established watercourses shall be protected against all

encroachments.
59.

PacifiCorp's Cutler Project, described above, is an integral part of PacifiCorp's

decreed water rights and power generation operations.
As the owner of the Cutler Project, and based on PacifiCorp's FERC obligations,

60.

PacifiCorp is entitled to access Cutler Reservoir for maintenance and other purposes.
61.

Cardon has, without consent, obstructed PacifiCorp's access to the Cutler

Reservoir water~ourse, thus preventing or obstructing Pacifi.Corp's passage to and fro:p:1 that
watercourse for maintenance and other purposes.
Cardon's conduct constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 73-1-15.

62.
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Amended Complaint

63.

PacifiCorp is therefore entitled to and requests judgment against Cardon (a)

permanently enjoining such obstruction and (b) for damages of a character and in an amount to
be determined at trial.
64.

Cardon's conduct obstructing access to the reservoir within the meaning of Utah

Code Ann.§ 73-1-15, entitles PacifiCorp to recover its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 73-2-28.
65.

Cardon has further obstructed PacifiCorp's maintenance and operation access to

portions of Cutler Reservoir.
66.

Pursuant to the decree filed in 1922 in the case of Utah Power & Light Company

v. Richmond Irrigation Company, et al, (Kimball D_ecree), PacifiCorp has the right to divert
water at the Stewart Dam and to impound and store water in Bear Lake Reservoir all the waters
of Bear River to the extent of 5500 cubic feet per second, together with the waters naturally
flowing into or arising in Bear Lake.
67.

PacifiCorp may pursuant to decree release water from Bear Lake into the natural

channel of the Bear River, for use at various points of diversion now existing, or which may be
established by PacifiCorp electric power generation.
68.

This diversion right is by decree continuous throughout the year without

limitation to time or season.
69.

There exists a former county road or lane that conn~cts to Sam Fellow Road

("Lane"). For decades, PacifiCorp and its predecessors in interest have used the Lane for access

to Cutler
Reservoir for management and maintenance purposes.
.
.
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70

Cardon has interfered with PacifiCorp's maintenance and management of Cutler

Reservoir.
71.

PacifiCorp is entitled to and requests a judgment enjoining and prohibiting

Cardon from further interfering with the Cutler/Bear River watercourse ,and PacifiCorp's access
to Cutler Reservoir over the Lane and otherwise, along with an award of re~onable attorney fees
incurred in prosecuting this action.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Based on these claims, plaintiff requests judgment as described above, and such other and
further relief as the Court deems just, including costs and reasonable attorney fees.
May

J!i, 2009.

(@ .

Plaintifrs Address:

201 S. Main, # 2300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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David C. Wright ~ 5566
MABEY WRIGHT & JAMES, PLLC
175 South Main, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-3663
Fax: (801) 359-3673
Email: dwright@majlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY

PACIFICORP,

F'INALDEFAULTJUDGMENT-

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No. 090100469

PAUL F. CARDON,
Defendant.

I
Judge Kevin K. Allen

Pursu_ant to the Court's Second Order for Discovery Sanctions, and for good cause
appe~g, the Court hereby enters the following Final Default Judgment:
It is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows:
Defendant is hereby immediately, permanently enjoined from the following:
1. Destroying or removing PacifiCorp's fence along the boundfl!Y_between Pacifi.Corp's

property and defendant's property,

MAR 2 9 2011 / i.o...O
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2. Unauthorized use of PacifiCorp property,
3. Trespassing on PacifiCorp property,
4. Irrigating, or farming on, PacifiCorp property,
5. Damaging PacifiCorp property,
6. Interfering with PacifiCorp operations at Cutler Reservoir,

7. Grazing/stockwatering on PacifiCorp property,

8. Destroying or permitting the destruction of the. vegetation along the banks of the Bear

River and/or Cutler_Reservoir,
9. Obstructing or preventing PacifiCorp access to Cutler Reservoir, including access along
the fonner county road or lane that connects to Sam Fellow ~oad. and that crosses
through defendant's property.
Dated ('(\ru: ~

, 2 &\ 2011

Approved as to Form:
Paul F. Cardon
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February~201 l, a copy of the foregoin~ Final Default Judgment was
delivered to the following by:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

[ ] Federal Express

(

[ ] Certified Mai~, Receipt No.

_.J

return receipt requested

[ ] Email/Electronic Delivery
Paul F.- Cardon
4407 West4700 North
Benson, Utah 84335
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Bret W.- Reich (9542) (Bret.Reich@pacifico:rp.com)
Sam Meziani (9821) (Sam.Mezfani@pacificorp.com)
PACIFICORP
1407 West North Tempie, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 220-4565

Attorneysfor Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH
IN TH8 FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY

PACIFICORP,

DECLARATION OF
Plaintiff,

EVEF.DAVIES

vs.
Civil No. 090100469

PAUL F~1CARDON,
Defendant.

Honorable Kevin K. Allen

Eve Davies, ~der Utah Co~e Ann. §78B-5-70S. states as follows:

1. I am employed by PacifiCorp as principal scientist· for hydro resources. My duties and

responsibilities include the management of Cutler Marsh and all environmental aspects or"
PacifiCorp's Federal Energy Re~aiory Co~ssio:q ("FERC") license and required
Resource Management Plan for ~e Cutler hydroelectric project. I have personal
Imowledge of the matters stated in ti ·declaration.
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2. Pursuant to an Order Issuing New License for the Cutler Project, Project No. 2420-001,
issued AJ?ril 29, 1994 by FERC, PacifiCorp is obligated to maintain a buffer strip, up to
200 feet wide, install and maintain fences, among other things, all designed to protect its
property and the integrity of the Cutler Project.
3. PacifiCorp was further required to prepare and implement a Resource Management Plan
(RMP), which it 4id ili July, 199S. An Order approving that plan was issued by F'.BRC in
November, 1995. In 2003, PacifiCorp submitted its first required Cutler Five-Year
Monitoring.Report, covering the period 1995-2002 and including the Cutler Monitoring

Plan.
4. The RMP and the various FERC orders require a permanent vegetative buffer around the
. reservoir on lands owned by PacifiCorp, erosion control and other features, many of
which are designed to prevent farming and agricultural encroachment to protect the
.integrity of the reservQir banks and improve water quality.

S. The various FERC orders require the development of the RMP and associated Cutler
Five-Year Monitoring· Report, which require·s, at a minim~ an annual inspection of all
Cutler buffer areas· atid fences, or more frequently where conditions warrant
6. By 2002, PacifiCorp installed fencing and other property line posts at Cutler Reservoir,

totaling more than 70 miles and 1100 acres of shoreline buffer.
7-.·· I have· also been involved for several years concerning PacifiCorp's long-standing
property issues with Paul Cardon. Paul Cardon farms land adjacent to PacifiCorp

4S80Slvl

-2..

?f\O
·-.

·. -· ·- ........... -- .......

property an4 adjacent to· the FERC•regulated buffer area. I have spoken to Cardon on
many occasions.

8. In 2011, PacifiCorp obtained a Final Default Judgment which, among other things,
prevents Paul Cardon from interfering with PacifiCorp's access to Cutler Reservoir and

its property. An aerial photograph depicting the lane mentioned in Paragraph 9 of the
Final Default Judgment is attached as Exhibit A.
9. On July 26, 2012, Bryan Westerberg, Scott Pratt (contractors for PacifiCorp) and I,
accompanied by ~he County Deputy Sheriff Casey Sutherland, visited the Cardon

property in order to complete an annual inspection. I requested Deputy Sutherland
accompany us, per a requirement from my manager, after a confrontation with Paul on
the property on June 6, 2012.

10. As we proceeded down the lane mentioned in Paragraph 9 of the 2011 Final Default
Judgment; a large farm truck was parked at a narrow point, precluding access. A
photograph of the farm truck is attached as ExhibitB.
11-.,0.fficer Sutherland approached Cardon's home and obtained permission from Cardon's

wife to use an altemate route immediately north of the access lane.
12. While the alternate route was narrow and slightly obstructed, we determined that it was
both dry enough and just wide enough to proceed.
13. After accessing the alternate lape route and driving to the end of the Cardon property

along the lane we have historically used, Bryan and I walked to our property to do the
monitoring; we completed the monitoring within 10 minut~s and returned to the truck.

4580Slvl
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"14., Upon our return to the lane, we encountered a spray of water where none had been
earlier. W.~ saw that an irrigation pipe had been tumed on in the 20 or so minutes since
we had passed. The ground in a small swale was very wet and muddy.
15. I estimate that injust a short while longer that area would have become impassable even

with a 4WD vehicle. (The area is notorious for clay soils). I observed Officer
Sutherland's pa1rol vehicle "fish tail" in the mud.

16. We made the sharp furn to the north to retrace our alternate path around the farm truck
blocking the historic access lane, but had to stop immediately as a front-end loader had
since been-parked sideways in the alternate lane, completely blocking that path as well.
A photograph of the front end loader is attached as Exhibit C.
17. We determined we could exit through another route to ~e north and left the Cardon
property.

18. Although Cardon did not show up to speak with us, it is clear he was there as our initial
path was obstructed, and our return path was hindered by water being turned on and a
loader was used to block us in during the 20-30' minutes we were on his propertyJ

accessing PacifiCorp property. When we attempted to find him, bis workers reported he
had gone to town.
19. On.July 17, 2013, Bryan Westerberg and Scott Piatt (contractors for PacifiCorp) and I,

accompanied by Cache County Deputy Sheriffs David Pugmire and Blake Hansen,
visited the PacifiCorp/Cardon property for an annual insp~ction.
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20. As we approached the Cardon property, we saw a large piece of farm equipment blocking
the right side of the access lane.

21 ~; I then ·witnessed Paul Cardon move a second large tractor in the lane, blocking the left
side access

as well.

22. Attached ·as Exhibit D is a photograph taken at the time of our visit that depicts both
pieces of fatm equipment completely blocking access to our property.
23. Upon our vehicle approach, Cardon exited the tractor and disappeared quickly into the

sU1Toundiilg outbuildings.
24. The Sheriff Deputies were unable to locate Cardon or anyon_e at the house.

25. W~ left the property after declining to take an alternate route. We were unable to

complete the annual inspection.
26. On April 30, 2014, Cardon was notified in writing that PacmCorp would be conducting a
site inspection.
27i On May 17, 2014, I called Mr. Wayne Cardon, Paul's father and our only contact with

Paul, to let him know I would be conducting an inspection the following week. On May
20, 2014, Wayne called to tell Die the water had been on for several days and I would not

be ·able to complete my inspection.
28. On June 4, 2014, I returned to the Cardon property with a technician, and Cache County

Deputy Sheriff Shane Zilles. Wayne Cardon, Paul Cardon' s father, saw us arrive and
followed us.

45805M

-5.-'··~

r,.

~...~}

29:- When I stopped to open a gate, Wayne approached me and stated there was "going to be
trouble." When I asked him what he meant., he said that I would "find out," and that I
should just go do whatever I felt I had to go do.
30. Wayne Cardon told Deputy Zilles the Cardons do not believe the Judgment gives

PacifiCorp the right to cross through Paul Cardon's property past the point where the old
county road ends. This is similar to Wayne Cardon's previous statements to me.
31. On several occasions., but most recently on May 17, 2014, Wayne Cat·don told me the

Judgment does not allow access beyond the point where the old county road ends.

32. I showed the Deputy Zilles the Judgment. Deputy Zilles stated that without a further
Court order, he cannot definitively instruct Cardon as to the meaning of the Judgment,
because Cardon believes the Judgment states something different
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
August 4, 2014.

RiI_ £. J)OAJiaJ

· Eve F. Davies
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August {, 2014, a copy of1he foregoing Declaration ofEve F, Da:vies
was delivered to the following by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

Paul F. Cardon
4407 West 4700 North
Benson, Utah 84335

Isl Sam Meziani

4ssos·1v1

-7-

....................

4

..( ...::"',,
I

i

'-!;;:/

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

PACIFICORP,
~

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

Case No. 090100469

vs.

PAUL F. CARDON,
@

Judge: Kevin K. Allen
Defendant.

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff PacifiCorp's Motion to
Enforce Judgment filed on August 4, 20 I 4. The Court has reviewed the moving papers and

examined applicable legal authorities. Having considered the foregoing, the Court issues the
following Memorandum Decision.

SUMMARY
PacifiCorp, operating as Rocky Mountain Power, owns and maintains a piece of property
surrounding a portion of Cutler Reservoir in Cache County, Utah. Pursu_ant to an order issued by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, PacifiCorp is required to maintain a 200 foot buffer
strip of vegetation in order to prevent farming and agricultural encroachme:q.t, which ~11 in turn
"protect the integrity of the re~ervoir banks and improve water quality~" Am~3:1ded Complaint at
2. In order to comply with the regulation, PacifiCorp must periodically access.the property to
perform inspections. Defendant Paul Cardon is an adjacent property owner.
In February 2009, PacifiCorp filed a lawsuit against Cardon alleging nuisance and

trespass. PacifiCorp also sought injunctive relief to prevent Cardon from inhibiting PacifiCorp's
access to its land. In its Amended Complaint, PacifiCorp requested the following:

-- ·--..,--

-
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69.
There exists a former county road or lane that connects to Sam
Fellow Road ("Lane"). For decades,. PacifiCorp and its predecessors in
interest have used the Lane for access to Culter Reservoir for management
and maintenance purposes.
70.
Cardon has interfered with PacifiCorp's maintenance and managementof
Cutler Reservoir.

71.
PacifiCorp is entitled to and requests a judgment enjoining and
prohibiting Cardon from further interfering with Cutler/Bear River watercourse
and PacifiCorp' s access to Culter Reservoir over the Lane and otherwise...
On March 29, 2011, the Court entered a Final Default Judgment against Cardon. As part
of that Judgment, Cardon was enjoined from "obstructing or preventing PacifiCorp's access to
Cutler Reservoir, including access along the former county road or lane that connects to Sam
Fellow Road and that crosses through Defendant's property." Final Default Judgment at 2, 19.

i)

PacifiCorp alleges Cardon has prevented it from accessing the property on at least three
occasions by placing large pieces of fann equipment to block the lane or by flooding it with

®

water. PacifiCorp contends Cardon's actions are in direct violation of the express language of the
Judgment. It now moves to enforce the Judgment.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
PacifiCorp seeks to enforce the Judgment by ~aving the Court issue an order reiterating that

Cardon shall not inhibit ·PacifiCorp' s access to its property. It also requests ·the Court order the
Cache County Sherriff's Office to escort PacifiCorp employees to the site if requested.

Cardon did not timely oppose the Motion. On September 2, 2014, PacifiCorp submitted
its Motion for decision. Cardon subsequently hired counsel and filed a Motion to Strike Request
to Submit and to Set Evidentiary Hearing. Cardon also filed a Motion to Enlarge Time to File

a

Response. A party has 14 days to file an opposition following service of a motion. UTAH R.
CIV. P. 7(c)(l). Cardon states his response was untimely because he thought it was unnecessary

2
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to file one since a hearing had been requested. Cardon relies on his pro se status at the time to

justify his neglect. Courts are generally lenient with pro se litigants. See generally Lundahl v.

Quinn, 2003 UT 11, 67 P.3d 10. The Court finds sufficient cause exists to excuse Cardon's

neglect. Although Cardon is expected to follow procedural rules just as every other party, the
Court's concern has been dispelled with the appearance of counsel on his behalf. Thus, the
Motion to Enlarge Time is granted and the Court will consider the Opposition. However, the
Court finds that it is not necessary to set the matter for a hearing because the issue has already
been authoritatively decided. UTAH R. C1v. P. 7(e). The Motion to Strike Request to Submit and

Set Evidentiary Hearing is therefore denied.
In opposition, Cardon maintains he is not violating the terms of the Judgment because the

former country road ends before reaching his farmyard. In addition, Cardon contends PacifiCorp has
access to Cutler Reservoir without having to drive through the middle of the property. · The Court
disagrees with Cardon,s interpretation.
"A judgment must be enforced as written if the language is clear and unambiguous."

Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389,391 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Cardon attempts to create an
ambiguity where none exists. He contends PacifiCorp has ample access to Cutler Reservoir long
@

before reaching the Cardon farmyard. Simple access to Cutler Reservoir is not what PacifiCorp
requested. The underlying purpose of the lawsuit was to prevent Cardon from interfering with
PacifiCorp's legal obligation to maintain the buffer strip on its property. PacifiCorp cannot perform

~

that obligation if it cannot access the property. Naturally, the Judgment does not give PacifiCorp
unfettered access to go wherever it wants on Cardon's property. It does, however, provide limited

access to the buffer strip "alo~g the former country road or lane that connects to Sam Fellow
Road and that crosses through Defendant's property." This includes the lane that passes through
Cardon's farm yard and connects with the pathway leading to PacifiCorp's property.
3
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce Judgment is granted. PacifiCorp shall

prepare and submit a proposed order in conformity,, with this Memorandum Decision.
p'11.~<
Dated this ..2__ day of November, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 090100469 by the method and on the date
specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

Date:

BLAKE s ATKIN jenn@atkinlawoffices.net
SAM MEZIANI Sam.Meziani@pacificorp.com
DAVID C WRIGHT dwright@mwjlaw.com

/s/ JANET REESE

11/03/2014

Deputy Court Clerk

Pagel (last)

Printed: ll/03/14 16:30:53
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Bret W. Reich (9542) (Bret.Reich@pacificorp.com)
Sam Meziani (9821)
(Sam.Meziani@pacificorp.com) PACIFICORP
1407 West North Temple, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 220-4565

Attorneys for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
®

PACIFICORP,

Plaintiff,
vs.

PAUL F. CARDON,
Defendant

ORDER
GRANTING
PACIFICORP'S MOTION
TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT
AND
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
ENLARGE TIME
AND
DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
Civil No. 090100469
Honorable Kevin K. Allen

The following motions are before the Court:
1. PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce Judgment, filed August 8, 2014;

2. Defendant's Motion to Strike Request to Submit for Decision and to Set Evidentiary
Hearing, filed September 8, 2014; and
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3. Defendant's Motion to Enlarge Time to File a Response to Plaintiffs Motion to
Enforce Judgment, filed September 22, 2014.

Based on the motions, supporting memoranda, Declaration of Eve F. Davies and exhibits,
and Declarations of Paul F. Cardon, all exhibits submitted in support, the Final Default Judgment
in this case dated March 29, 2011, and for Good Cause Appearing, the Court hereby orders as
follows:
1. Defendant's Motions.
A. Motion to Enlarge Time

Defendant's Motion to Enlarge Time is GRANTED. The Court has therefore
considered Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce
Judgment.
B. Motion to Strike Request to Submit for Decision
Defendant's Motion to Strike Request to Submit for Decision and to Set

Evidentiary Hearing is DENIED.
2. PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce Judgment.

PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce Judgment is GRANTED.
1.

As required by Paragraph 9 of the Final Default Judgment dated March 29, 2011, Paul F.
Cardon shall not obstruct or prevent PacifiCorp's access to Cutler Reservoir
"including access along the former county road or lane that connects to Sam Fellow
Road and that crosses through defendant's property." This includes the lane that
passes through Cardon' s property and connects with the route leading to
PacifiCorp' s
property.

r--~)
...___._,,JI

2. Ifrequested by PacifiCorp, the Cache County Sheriffs Office shall escort PacifiCorp
employees onto the Cardon property in order to enforce this Order and to protect the
safety of PacifiCorp employees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November_, 2014.
BY THE COURT:
Honorable Kevin K. Allen
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 17, 2014, a copy of the foregoing Order Granting
PacifiCorp's Motion to Enforce Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Enlarge Time and
Denying Defendant's Motion to Strike was delivered to the following by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid:

Blake S. Atkin
Atkin Law Offices, P. C.
7579North West Side Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010

PACIFICORP
Isl Sam Meziani
Bret W. Reich
Sam Meziani
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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